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Divided We Fall: Religion, Politics, and the Lemon Entanglements Prong
Abstract:
The 2008 campaign for the presidency should remind Americans that mixing religion and
politics can be dangerous. Polls show that more than half of American voters would hesitate to
support a Mormon candidate. In terms of establishment-clause doctrine, the entanglements
prong of the Lemon test provides a mechanism for protecting political equality by ensuring
against religiously-inspired political divisiveness. Yet, in recent years, numerous scholars and
Supreme Court justices have attacked the entanglements prong. Indeed, the Court has poked so
many holes in the entanglements inquiry that it may no longer exist. This Article defends the
political-divisiveness component of the entanglements prong. The political theory of pluralist
democracy, the social science research documenting the power of religious identity, and the
history of religious discrimination in the United States demonstrate that the importation of
religious divisions into the political realm can thwart the pluralist democratic process. Pluralist
democracy demands that each and every citizen be afforded a full and fair opportunity to
participate, to assert his or her interests and values in the democratic arena. Citizens, then, must
be willing to negotiate and compromise with other citizens, who are equally entitled to assert
their interests and values. But religiously-inspired political positions sometimes cannot be
compromised; they are absolutes. Moreover, when political stances form around religious
orientations, religious outsiders inevitably lose merely because they are minorities. Throughout
American history, dominant religious groups have translated their values into political goals and
imposed them on minorities. Given this, the Court should promote political equality and protect
religious minorities from the ravages wrought by religiously-inspired political divisiveness. To
do so, the Court should interpret the establishment clause to proscribe governmental programs
funding religious activities and institutions and governmental displays of religious symbols.
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Divided We Fall: Religion, Politics, and the Lemon Entanglements Prong

For three decades, conservatives in the United States have championed a reliance on
religious values and dogma in political deliberations.1 Yet, historical and current events from
around the world illustrate what can happen when religion and politics are combined: they can
make for a volatile mix. In the 1640s, to take one example, conflict between the Anglican and
Catholic-leaning King Charles I and a (Protestant) Puritan-led Parliament catapulted England
into civil war (and led to the king’s eventual beheading).2 Today, current events in Iraq
demonstrate how political strife engendered by religious divisions—between Sunni and Shiite
Muslims, in particular—might thwart efforts to implement democracy.3 Nonetheless, Americans
can too easily dismiss distant events from the past and from other nations. Religion might hinder
democracy elsewhere, but it couldn’t happen here—or, at least, many Americans apparently so
believe.
The run for the 2008 presidential nominations, however, should bring home to Americans
why mixing religion and politics can be dangerous. Mitt Romney, former governor of
Massachusetts, carried the conservative credentials that would seem to cast him as an ideal

1

Barry A. Kosmin & Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American
Society 197-99 (1993); e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief (1993); Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked
Public Square (1984); Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, reprinted in Law and Religion:
A Critical Anthology 89 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
2

Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of
Church and State 84-92 (1997) [hereinafter Feldman, Please Don’t].
3

Seymour M. Hersh, A Strategic Shift, New Yorker, March 5, 2007
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh> (accessed January 9, 2008); Sabrina
Tavernise, Sunni-Shiite Violence Points to Religious War, International Herald Tribune, May 28, 2005
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/27/news/sunni.php> (accessed January 9, 2008). For an optimistic assessment
of the compatibility of democracy with forms of Islam, see Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle
for Islamic Democracy (2003).
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substantial percentage of Americans and an even higher percentage of Republicans would
hesitate to vote for Romney solely because of his religion; he is a member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints.5 The Washington Post reported polls showing that 24 percent of
Americans would not vote for a Mormon for president, while 42 percent of Republicans “would
either not vote for a Mormon or would do so with some level of doubt.”6 According to an NBC
News/Wall Street Journal poll, a whopping 53 percent of Americans “were very uncomfortable
or have some reservations” about voting for a Mormon presidential candidate.7
Given these numbers, rival Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee
unsurprisingly prodded Republican voters on the campaign trail to remember that he is an
ordained Southern Baptist minister, that Romney is Mormon, and that Huckabee is therefore
more trustworthy. With ostensible innocence, Huckabee asked, “Don’t Mormons believe that
Jesus and the devil are brothers?”8 In fact, many evangelical churches teach that Mormonism is
an anti-Christian cult that worships Satan.9 One televangelist declared, “If you vote for Mitt
Romney, you are voting for Satan!”10 Leading up to the Iowa caucuses on January 3, 2008,
4

Amy Sullivan, Mitt Romney’s Evangelical Problem, Washington Monthly, Sept. 2005
<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.sullivan1.html> (accessed Jan. 9, 2008).
5

Thomas Burr, Poll Shows Romney’s Faith Speech Did Little To Sway Mormon-shy Voters, Salt Lake
Tribune, Dec. 12, 2007 <http://www.sltrib.com/ci_7698653> (accessed Jan. 8, 2008); Jill Lawrence, Will Mormon
Faith Hurt Bid for White House?, USA Today, March 12, 2007 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/200702-12-romney-cover_x.htm> (accessed Jan. 8, 2008); Howard Berkes, Faith Could Be Hurdle in Romney’s White
House Bid, National Public Radio, Feb. 8, 2007 <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7245768>
(accessed Jan. 8, 2008).
6

Chris Cillizza, Parsing the Polls: Answering the Mormon Question, washingtonpost.com’s Politics Blog
<http://blog.washingtonpost.com/thefix/2007/02/parsing_the_polls_the_mormon_q.html> (accessed Jan. 8, 2008).
7

Berkes, supra note 5.

8

Libby Quaid, Huckabee Questions Mormons’ Belief, Breitbart@com, Dec. 11, 2007
<http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8TFL9B81&show_article=1> (accessed Jan. 8, 2008).
9

Sullivan, supra note 4.

10

Jonathan Chait, Pray Tell, New Republic, Nov. 19, 2007, at 5, 5.

Divided We Fall -3Huckabee repeatedly reminded voters that he was the Christian candidate11 and aired
commercials proclaiming him a “Christian leader.”12 His strategy apparently helped: he won
Iowa, with 60 percent of the Republican caucus participants being evangelicals.13
Iowa was just the beginning. At the national level, approximately 26 percent of
Americans and 30 percent of Republicans are evangelical Christians. 14 Moreover, as reported in
the recent Pew Forum Religious Landscape Survey, “[t]he South, by a wide margin, has the
heaviest concentration of members of evangelical Protestant churches.”15 Thus, when nearly half
the states held primaries and caucuses on Super Tuesday, February 5, 2008, the results were alltoo-predictable. As summarized in the Washington Post, “Huckabee dominated the South,
winning his native Arkansas as well as Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, and West Virginia.”16

11

Rebecca Sinderbrand, New Huckabee Ad Appeals to Christian Conservatives, CNN.com, Jan. 1, 2008
<http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/01/huckabee.christians/index.html> (accessed January 9, 2008); Michelle
Vu, Huckabee Defends Jesus as Point of Christmas, Christian Post, Dec. 25, 2007
<http://www.christianpost.com/article/20071225/30638_Huckabee_Defends_Jesus_as_Point_of_Christmas.htm>
(accessed Jan. 9, 2008); Amy Sullivan, Huckabee’s Bid for the Christian Right, Time, Oct. 22, 2007
<http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1674340,00.html> (accessed January 9, 2008).
12

Huckabee Ad <http://www.godlikeproductions.com/forum1/message472456/pg1> (accessed January 9,

2008).
13

Michael Luo & David D. Kirkpatrick, At Huckabee Centrtal, Cheers for Evangelical Base, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/us/politics/04repubs.html?_r=1&oref=slogin> (accessed Jan. 9,
2008).
14

The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, 2008, at 12 (2008)
[hereinafter Religious Landscape Survey] (reporting that 26.3 percent of Americans belong to evangelical churches);
Sullivan, supra note 4 (reporting percentage of Republicans).
15

Religious Landscape Survey, supra note 14, at 8; see Kosmin & Lachman, supra note 1, at 49-55
(discussing geographical distribution of Baptists).
16

Perry Bacon, Jr., Gamble Paid Off for Huckabee on Tuesday, Washington Post, Feb. 7, 2008
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/AR2008020604125.html?hpid=topnews>
(accessed February 24, 2008); see Michael Kranish, Evangelical Voters Bolster Huckabee in Southern States,
Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 2008
<http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/02/06/evangelical_voters_bolster_huckabee_in_southern_states/
> (accessed February 24, 2008) (discussing effect of evangelical voters).
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dropped out of the race.18
Whether or not we admit it, Americans are “divided by God,” in the words of Noah
Feldman.19 Religious divisions propel many Americans into political disputes—over abortion,
same-sex marriage, the death penalty, and a host of other issues. Recent Supreme Court cases
confronting establishment-clause issues, such as the constitutionality of public displays of the
Ten Commandments, “raise the central challenges of citizenship and peoplehood: who belongs
here? To what kind of nation do we belong?”20 In terms of democracy, the question becomes
one of political equality: who is entitled to participate as a member of equal status in the
American polity?21
With regard to establishment-clause doctrine, such questions of belonging—of equal
participation in the democratic polity—can be addressed under the ambit of the entanglements
prong of the Lemon test. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged
standard for resolving establishment-clause issues. “First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with

17

Scott Lehigh, Unpersuasive to the End, Boston Globe, Feb. 8, 2008
<http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/02/08/unpersuasive_to_the_end/>
(accessed February 26, 2008).
18

John Sullivan & Michael Luo, Romney Exits, Saying He Has to ‘Stand Aside for Our Party,’ New York
Times, Feb. 7, 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/us/politics/07cndrepubs.html?_r=1&ref=us&oref=slogin> (accessed February 24, 2008).
19

Noah Feldman, Divided By God (2005) [hereinafter Divided]. According to Feldman (for what it’s
worth, we are not relatives), “[t]he deep divide in American life … is not primarily over religious belief or
affiliation—it is over the role that belief should play in the business of politics and government.” Id. at 6.
20

21

Id. at 7.

See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 Cal.
L. Rev. 673, 674-93 (2002) (arguing that, after World War II, the Court increasingly interpreted the establishment
clause as protecting political equality).

Divided We Fall -5religion.’”22 Lemon arose from challenges to two state statutes that provided funding to religious
schools for teachers’ salaries, books, and other instructional materials to be used when teaching
secular subjects. Chief Justice Warren Burger’s majority opinion reasoned that these state
programs violated the third Lemon prong by generating two impermissible types of governmental
entanglements with religion. One type of entanglement was administrative. When the
government supplies money to a religious institution for secular purposes—such as funding for
teachers in parochial schools—then the government will need to monitor the use of the funds to
insure that they are not diverted for religious activities. Such governmental surveillance (and
potential control) of a religious institution amounts to unconstitutional entanglement.23 More
central to this Article, the second type of impermissible entanglement arose because the
governmental actions were likely to engender political divisiveness corresponding with religious
differences.24 Burger concluded: “The potential for political divisiveness related to religious
belief and practice is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for continuing
annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations
grow.”25
This constitutional protection against religiously-inspired political divisiveness provides a
doctrinal means for policing against political inequality. When religious differences are
translated into political differences, then religious minorities will likely be the losers. They will
be precluded from equally participating in the democratic polity precisely because their religious
beliefs and practices set them apart. Religious differences will be transformed into diminished
political power—into a reduced capacity to influence political debates. Even so, despite the
apparent importance of the entanglements prong, with its political divisiveness component,
22

403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).

23

Id. at 614-22.

24

Id. at 622-24.

25

Id. at 623.
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numerous scholars and justices have attacked it. Most recently, Richard W. Garnett advocated
abandoning the entanglements prong altogether because, he reasoned, the establishment clause
should not be invoked as a mechanism to standardize or homogenize the people and their
political desires. If the people politically divide along religious lines, so be it.26 Noah Feldman
has argued that the Court’s reliance on the establishment clause to protect political equality both
departs from the original purpose of the clause and leads to untoward doctrinal consequences.27
The justices, meanwhile, have poked so many holes in the entanglements prong that it may no
longer exist.
This Essay defends the Lemon entanglements prong, particularly its political divisiveness
component. If the Court were to stop protecting against religiously-inspired political
divisiveness, the Court would contravene the conception of democracy that it has persistently
articulated and developed since the late 1930s.28 In a pluralist democracy, such as we have in the
United States today, the Court should generally ensure that all Americans have a fair and equal
opportunity to participate in the democratic arena.29 More specifically, the Court should
implement the establishment clause as a mechanism for protecting religious minorities’
participatory equality.30 American history unfortunately provides numerous examples where the
26

Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L.J. 1667 (2006).

27

According to Noah Feldman, the original purpose of the establishment clause was to protect liberty of
conscience. Divided, supra note 19, at 19-56; From Liberty, supra note 21, at 679-84; Noah Feldman, The
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346 (2002). Doctrinally, Feldman argues that
the protection of political equality has led the Court, first, to articulate tenuous distinctions between public and
private actions—where the establishment-clause limits do not apply to private actions—and, second, to allow some
governmental funding of religious activities if the funding is supplied equally (or neutrally) to non-religious
activities and institutions. From Liberty, supra note 21, at 718-30.
28

Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America: A History (University of Chicago
Press, forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Feldman, Free Expression]; Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in
Different Democratic Regimes, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 47, 62-98 (2006) [hereinafter Feldman, Unenumerated Rights].
29

John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) (arguing that the Court should police the democratic

process).
30

Cf., Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Equal Regard, in Law and Religion: A Critical
Anthology 200, 203 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (arguing that the religion clauses embody a broad principle of
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religious majority not only has disregarded minorities, slighting their interests and values in
democratic deliberations, but also has purposefully persecuted them.
Part I of this Article reviews Burger’s Lemon reasoning on political divisiveness, follows
the justices’ development of the entanglements prong, and then discusses the Court’s recent
retreat from the entanglements inquiry.31 Part II defends the entanglements prong on the basis of
democratic theory, social science research, and American history.32 Why, precisely, should
courts seek to protect against religiously-inspired political divisiveness? Part III identifies types
of governmental actions that the entanglements prong should proscribe.33 What governmental
actions are likely to generate religiously-inspired political divisiveness? Part IV, the conclusion,
responds to Garnett’s and Noah Feldman’s arguments and ends with a coda on religion in the
2008 presidential race.34
I. Lemon, Political Divisiveness, and Judicial Retreat
A. On Lemon
While Chief Justice Burger explicated a three-pronged test in Lemon—purpose, effects,
and entanglement—his majority opinion focused on the third prong.35 He reasoned that the
“equal regard,” which “demands that the interests and concerns of every member of the political community should
be treated equally, that no person or group should be treated as unworthy or otherwise subordinated to an inferior
status”).
31

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

32

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

33

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

34

See infra text accompanying notes _-_.

35

The judicial concern with protecting against excessive entanglements had been developing in cases
preceding Lemon, including Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (stating that the first amendment protects against governmental involvement in sectarian affairs that
might give rise to “divisive influences”); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Goldberg’s Abington concurrence on “divisive influences”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York
City, 397 U.S. 664, 694-99 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating a concern for entanglements that included
political divisiveness and administrative entanglements). The idea of protecting political equality under the compass
of the establishment clause began to take shape in even earlier first amendment cases. From Liberty, supra note 21,
at 679-93.
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disputed governmental funding programs violated the first amendment because they generated
excessive administrative entanglement and political divisiveness along religious lines.36 With
regard to political divisiveness, Burger explained:
In a community where such a large number of pupils are served by church-related
schools, it can be assumed that state assistance will entail considerable political activity.
Partisans of parochial schools, understandably concerned with rising costs and sincerely
dedicated to both the religious and secular educational missions of their schools, will
inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. Those
who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will
inevitably respond and employ all of the usual political campaign techniques to prevail.
Candidates will be forced to declare and voters to choose. It would be unrealistic to
ignore the fact that many people confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes
aligned with their faith.37
Quite sensibly, Burger sought to bolster his position by discussing the workings of
democracy. He began with a reasonable point that numerous justices had reiterated since World
War II. “Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal
and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government. …”38 Then, citing a law
36

403 U.S. at 614-24.

37

Id. at 622.

38

Id. “[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger.” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from
the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this
kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
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review article by Paul Freund, Burger asserted a historical fact of questionable accuracy.
Although vigorous political division and debate was normal, “political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.”39 Regardless of whether this historical assertion was correct, Burger followed with a
another reasonable point about democracy: “The potential divisiveness of such [religiouslyinspired political] conflict is a threat to the normal political process.”40 Why might that be?
Here again, Burger’s opinion came up short. The mixing of church and state not only could
engender governmental interference with religious institutions, Burger reasoned, but also vice
versa, religion could interfere with governmental practices. Religiously-inspired political
divisiveness “could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems” confronting
governmental officials and institutions.41 In the Lemon case itself, “[t]o have States or
communities divide on the issues presented by state aid to parochial schools would tend to
confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency.”42
While the Court continues to invoke the Lemon test more than thirty-five years after its
introduction,43 numerous justices have criticized it,44 and Court majorities have referred to it as

39

403 U.S. at 622 (citing Paul Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1692
(1969)). Freund himself made this historical assertion without providing evidence or citing historical sources. In
fact, the history of the adoption of the first-amendment religion clauses is ambiguous and complex. The first
Congress and the framing generation probably were not contemplating potential political divisiveness when they
adopted the establishment clause. Feldman, Please Don’t, supra note 2, at 145-74 (discussing the emergence of the
first amendment against the background of the American Revolution and the constitutional framing in general);
Divided, supra note 19, at 19-56 (discussing the origins of the religion clauses).
40

403 U.S. at 622.

41

Id. at 623.

42

Id. at 622-23.

43

E.g., McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding a
display of the Ten Commandments unconstitutional pursuant to the Lemon test).
44

Id. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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suggest (and sometimes to apply) alternative doctrinal tests for resolving establishment-clause
disputes. The coercion test, initially delineated by Justice Anthony Kennedy, has two parts:
first, the “government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise,”46 and second, the government “may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact ‘establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”47 The endorsement test, introduced by Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, also has two parts: first, does the state action create excessive
governmental entanglement with religion, and second, does the state action amount to
governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion.48 Indeed, when O’Connor originally
articulated the endorsement test, she suggested that it might be interpreted in two ways. On the
one hand, the endorsement test might be read as no more than a reformulation of the Lemon
test,49 or on the other hand, it might be interpreted as emphasizing the protection of political
equality.50 O’Connor wrote: “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message.”51 Religion cannot be a ground for diminishing an individual’s connection

45

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).

46

County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
47

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).

48

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

49

O’Connor explained that the endorsement test “clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.” Id. at
689 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
50

Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543

51

465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

(1986).
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to or participation in the democratic arena. “The Establishment Clause prohibits government
from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political
community.”52
No part of the Lemon test has proven more controversial than the entanglements prong.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Lemon itself, Justice Byron White accepted the
purpose and effects prongs, which the Court had previously articulated,53 but questioned the
majority’s focus on entanglements. He criticized the Court’s reasoning as a “curious and
mystifying blend”54 and claimed that the entanglements prong created an “insoluble paradox.”55
The second Lemon prong, proscribing religious effects, required the government to ensure that
any public funding supplied to religious schools was not used to advance religion. Yet,
governmental monitoring of religious schools—to track the use of public funds—was likely to be
deemed excessive entanglement.
B. Application of the Entanglements Prong
Despite White’s initial reservations about Lemon’s third prong, the justices continued for
more than a decade to apply the prong. They determined in numerous establishment-clause
cases whether the governmental action created excessive entanglements. In Tilton v.
Richardson, decided the same day as Lemon, a five-justice majority upheld a federal statute that
provided grants to colleges and universities, including religious schools, for the construction of
buildings devoted to secular education.56 In discussing the issue of administrative entanglement,
Burger’s plurality opinion emphasized the differences between primary and secondary schools,

52

Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

53

Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963).
54

403 U.S. at 666 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).

55

Id. at 668 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).

56

403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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on the one hand, and schools of higher education, on the other hand. The Catholic institutions of
higher education involved in the case predominantly aimed “to provide their students with a
secular education.”57 Consequently, unlike the funding programs invalidated in Lemon, the
government here did not need to monitor closely the schools’ activities to ensure that public
monies were not diverted to religious purposes.58 Two years later, in Hunt v. McNair, the Court
followed the Tilton reasoning to uphold a state program that authorized revenue bonds for a
sectarian college,59 but that same day, in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, the Court invalidated a state law funding religious primary and secondary schools.60
Because the Nyquist Court resolved the case based on the effects prong, it did not discuss
potential administrative entanglement. Nonetheless, in dictum, the Court cautioned against the
likelihood of engendering political divisiveness; public funding of religious schools “carries
grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to
religion.”61
The Court continued with such fact specific analyses of entanglement in subsequent
cases. In Meek v. Pittenger, decided in 1975, the Court invalidated a state program that provided
teachers and counselors to elementary and secondary religious schools for the performance of
auxiliary services, such as remedial instruction, on school premises.62 The Court reasoned that
the state failed the entanglements prong because of both administrative entanglement and
57

Id. at 687.

58

Id. at 684-88.

59

413 U.S. 734 (1973).

60

413 U.S. 756 (1973).

61

Id. at 794. The same day, the Court decided additional establishment-clause cases. In Levitt v. Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), the Court invalidated pursuant to the Lemon effects
prong a state program that funded testing in religious schools. In Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), the Court
invalidated also pursuant to the effects prong a state program providing for reimbursement of tuition paid to private
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political divisiveness. Although the teachers and counselors were public employees, they would
be “performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part
of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of
religious belief is constantly maintained.”63 The state therefore needed not only to impose
restrictions on the employees, to ensure that they “remain religiously neutral,”64 but also to
“engage in some form of continuing surveillance to ensure that those restrictions were being
followed.”65 This degree of contact between state and religious personnel and the monitoring
involved constituted excessive administrative entanglement. Moreover, the Court reasoned that
the state funding program was likely to generate religiously-inspired “political strife,”66 further
contravening the entanglements prong. “The recurrent nature of the appropriation process
[engendered] the prospect of repeated confrontation between proponents and opponents of the
auxiliary-services program [and would create] successive opportunities for political
fragmentation and division along religious lines.”67 Yet, the next year, in Roemer v. Board of
Public Works of Maryland, the Court upheld in a five-to-four decision a statute providing for
“annual noncategorical grants to private colleges,”68 including religious schools, so long as the
funds were not used for “‘sectarian purposes.’”69 Justice Harry Blackmun’s plurality opinion,
joined by only two other justices, reasoned that, under this program, “[t]he need for close
surveillance of purportedly secular activities” was minimal and that, consequently, excessive

63

Id. at 371.
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Id. at 372.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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annual reconsideration of the funding, it was unlikely to generate political divisiveness, partly
because more than two-thirds of the private colleges eligible under the program were secular.71
One year later, in Wolman v. Walter, the Court confronted a complex state statute that supplied
various types of aid to primary and secondary religious schools.72 A divided Court, with
multiple opinions, upheld most of the provisions. For instance, with regard to the supplying and
scoring of standardized tests, a four-justice plurality reasoned that “the inability of the school to
control the test eliminates the need for the supervision that gives rise to excessive
[administrative] entanglement.”73 But with regard to the funding of field trips, a majority
concluded that administrative entanglement existed because the public school officials would
need to keep the religious-school teachers under “close supervision” to ensure that funds were
not diverted for religious purposes.74
Aguilar v. Felton, decided in 1985, arose from a challenge to a New York City program
that used federal funds (pursuant to federal statute) to pay teachers for remedial instruction of
religious school students on school premises. The city assigned the teachers as well as
supervisory personnel, who monitored the teachers to assure that the funding was used for
secular rather than religious education.75 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held this program
unconstitutional primarily because of administrative entanglement. To operate under the
program, city and school personnel would need to cooperate closely. While such close contact
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Id. at 762.
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Id. at 765.
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433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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Id. at 240-41.
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Id. at 254.
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were required exacerbated the constitutional violation.77 “Agents of the city must visit and
inspect the religious school regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matter in
[the] classes.”78 The Court concluded by obscurely suggesting a tie between, on the one hand,
the governmental surveillance that manifested administrative entanglement and, on the other
hand, political divisiveness. “The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of the city
concern matters that may be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance
to the controlling denominations. As government agents must make these judgments, the
dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines increase.”79 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Lewis Powell explained political divisiveness differently. Like the Courts in Meek and
Nyquist (in dictum), Powell reasoned that if religious schools can pursue public funding in the
legislative arena, then ongoing political battles are likely to generate political divisiveness in
accordance with religious divisions. Catholics will seek funding for Catholic schools; Baptists
will seek funding for Baptist schools; Jews will seek funding for Jewish schools; and so forth.80
76

Id. at 413.

77

Id.

78

Id. The Court added:

The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in Lemon and Meek are thus present in this case.
First, as noted above, the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian environment. Second, because
assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a
religious message. In short, the scope and duration of New York City’s Title I program would require a
permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.
Id. at 412-13.
79

Id. at 414.

80

Id. at 416-18 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell wrote:

[T]here remains a considerable risk of continuing political strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious
schools and the proper allocation of limited governmental resources. As this Court has repeatedly
recognized, there is a likelihood whenever direct governmental aid is extended to some groups that there
will be competition and strife among them and others to gain, maintain, or increase the financial support of
government.
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C. Judicial Retreat
From 1971, when the Court decided Lemon, to 1985, when the Court decided Aguilar, an
unmistakable trend emerged regarding the entanglements prong. For a period of time after
Lemon, the justices accepted and applied its third prong with equanimity. The cases, it seemed,
turned on the facts. Gradually, however, an increasing number of justices began to express
dissatisfaction and even hostility toward the entanglements inquiry. Of course, this
dissatisfaction started with White’s opinion in Lemon, when he claimed that an entanglements
inquiry created an “insoluble paradox.”81 In 1976, White reiterated this critique and
recommended the abandonment of the entanglements prong in his Roemer concurrence, joined
by Justice William H. Rehnquist.82 Even in those first years after Lemon, as between the two
types of entanglement, the justices tended to stress administrative entanglement over political
divisiveness. While Lemon appeared to accord equal importance to the two types of
entanglement, administrative entanglement quickly assumed a position of prominence, as the
justices focused on governmental surveillance and control over religious schools in a variety of
public funding scenarios. In fact, the Court never found political divisiveness without first
finding administrative entanglement.83
In the 1980s, the justices’ skepticism toward the entanglements prong intensified, with
particular suspicion directed toward the political-divisiveness component. In Mueller v. Allen,
decided in 1983, the Court upheld a state law granting tax deductions to parents who paid tuition

Id. at 416 (Powell, J., concurring). In a companion case, the Court invalidated under the effects prong a similar
funding program that lacked the supervisory mandates of the New York City program. School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
81

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).

82

Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
83

E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (finding political divisiveness and administrative
entanglement), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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possibility of administrative entanglements, and then dropped a footnote that sought to narrow
the reach of the political-divisiveness component.85 This footnote can be construed as dictum
because, as Rehnquist acknowledged, “[n]o party to this litigation has urged” that the state tax
law contravened this component of entanglements.86 Regardless, the majority reasoned that
Lemon should be strictly limited to its facts, so findings of impermissible political divisiveness
would be “confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to
teachers in parochial schools.”87 The next year, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court upheld a
governmental exhibition of a crèche as part of an extensive Christmas display in Pawtucket,
Rhode Island.88 After quickly finding no administrative entanglement,89 the Burger majority
opinion cited the Mueller footnote and explained that the Court did not even need to discuss
political divisiveness. “This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools
or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into potential political
divisiveness is even called for.”90 Despite thus limiting the political-divisiveness inquiry, Burger
added that, for forty years, until the filing of the lawsuit, nobody had complained about the
crèche display and that, therefore, political divisiveness did not exist.91 O’Connor joined
Burger’s majority opinion but also wrote a concurrence, where she introduced the endorsement
test. Even though O’Connor suggested that her new establishment-clause standard might be
84

463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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Id. at 403.
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Id. at 403 n.11. The Court stated that an amicus curiae brief raised the issue of political divisiveness. Id.
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Id. at 403-04 n.11.

88

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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465 U.S. at 684.
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Id.
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Id. at 684-85.
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interpreted to protect political equality, she nonetheless insisted that “political divisiveness along
religious lines should not be an independent test of constitutionality.”92 To inquire into whether
a particular governmental action generated political divisiveness was, according to O’Connor,
“too speculative an enterprise.”93 The “constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the
character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness
itself. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional
entanglement.”94
The justices’ assault on the entanglements prong continued in 1985. In Wallace v.
Jaffree, the Court held that a state statute authorizing a period of silence for “meditation or
voluntary prayer” violated the Lemon purpose prong.95 Rehnquist dissented, returning to Justice
White’s argument that the entanglements prong left governments facing an “insoluble
paradox.”96 In the school funding cases, “we have required aid to parochial schools to be closely
watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself will create an
entanglement.”97 According to Rehnquist, the entanglements prong was practically unworkable
and should, therefore, be abandoned (in fact, he attacked the entirety of the Lemon test).98 Next
came Aguilar, in which the majority relied heavily on the entanglements prong to invalidate the
governmental funding program. O’Connor dissented, joined by Rehnquist, and she now
denounced the entanglements prong even more vigorously than she had in her Lynch
concurrence. She argued that the Court should overrule Meek, which had held that a funding
92

Id. at 689 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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472 U.S. 38, 41, 55-57 (1985).
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Id. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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program violated the Lemon prohibition against administrative entanglement. The Meek Court
had reasoned that surveillance was needed to ensure that public school teachers taught only
secular lessons when working in religious school classrooms. O’Connor now maintained that
such surveillance was unnecessary and that, consequently, administrative entanglement did not
exist.99 Going further, O’Connor not only repudiated the political-divisiveness component of the
entanglements prong, she also argued that the Court should no longer inquire into “institutional”
entanglements.100 Rehnquist wrote his own dissent, reiterating his position that the Court had
created a “‘Catch-22’ paradox.”101
When Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy joined the Court in 1986 and 1988
respectively, Rehnquist and O’Connor had the votes needed to pronounce their hostilities toward
the entanglements prong in majority opinions (White did not retire until 1993). In Bowen v.
Kendrick, decided in 1988, the Court upheld a federal grant program that funded organizations,
including religious ones, dealing with adolescent sexuality and pregnancy.102 Writing for a fivejustice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that the federal statutory program required the
government to monitor the use of the public funds to some extent. Yet, Rehnquist would not be
caught on the horns of “yet another ‘Catch-22’ argument [whereby] the very supervision of the
aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid.”103 He refused to find
administrative entanglement because, he reasoned, the funded organizations were not as

99

Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 427-28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

100

Id. at 429 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

101

Id. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the
supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement”).
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487 U.S. 589 (1988).

103

Id. at 615.
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pervasive enough to constitute “excessive entanglement.”105
Matters came to a head in 1997 when the Court reconsidered the federal funding program
held unconstitutional in Aguilar. Such a program would allow New York City to pay teachers
for remedial instruction of religious school students on school premises. In Agostini v. Felton, a
five-to-four decision with a majority opinion by O’Connor, the Court overruled Aguilar and
upheld the funding statute.106 Since the Aguilar Court had relied on the entanglements prong,
O’Connor enthusiastically and predictably sought to break the supports of the Aguilar holding by
attenuating the entanglements inquiry. She began by reasoning that, generally, the Court had
considered the same factors to ascertain governmental effects, under the second Lemon prong,
and excessive entanglements, under the third Lemon prong. “[T]o assess entanglement, we have
looked to ‘the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid
that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious
authority.’”107 Because of these overlapping analyses, O’Connor concluded, “it is simplest”108 to
“treat”109 entanglement “as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.”110 Lemon, it seemed,
had become a two-pronged test, examining purpose and effects. Turning specifically to Aguilar,
O’Connor reasoned that it had “rested on three grounds,” none of which could any longer sustain
the weight of the decision. When it came to administrative entanglement, O’Connor explained
that the Court no longer assumed that governmental officials needed to monitor the teachers, and
104

Id. at 616.
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Id. at 617.
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521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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Id. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
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Id. at 233.
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Id.

110

Id.
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that, moreover, the Court now found that a reasonable degree of cooperation and surveillance did
not constitute excessive entanglement. Finally, O’Connor concluded that political divisiveness
was “insufficient”111 by itself “to create an ‘excessive’ entanglement.”112 The federal funding
program did not contravene the effects prong, including its entanglements component.113
While some justices, particularly Stephen Breyer and David Souter, still invoke politicaldivisiveness concerns in some guise,114 a majority of justices have continued after Agostini to
spurn the entanglements inquiry, especially the political-divisiveness component. In Mitchell v.
Helms, decided in 2000, a six-justice majority upheld a federal funding program that provided
for the loan of educational materials, such as library and computer equipment, to primary and
secondary schools, including religious schools.115 Writing for a plurality, Justice Clarence
Thomas emphasized the changes to the Lemon test that Agostini had wrought:
Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has
a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive
entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon for
purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors.
We … recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to
111

Id.

112

Id. at 233-34.

113

The Court wrote:

To summarize, New York City's Title I program does not run afoul of any of three primary criteria we
currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: It does not result in
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive
entanglement.
Id. at 234.
114

McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 859-63 (2005) (Souter
majority opinion discussing endorsement-political divisiveness concerns as part of purpose prong); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer dissenting opinion emphasizing the establishment-clause
protection against political divisiveness).
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determining a statute's effect. We also acknowledged that our cases had pared somewhat
the factors that could justify a finding of excessive entanglement.116
Then, quoting from Agostini, Thomas iterated the “‘three primary criteria we currently use to
evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: It does not result in
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive
entanglement.’”117 Regardless, despite Thomas’s efforts to dim the already-fading lights of the
entanglements prong, he then admitted that the Court did not need to address the entanglements
issue because the litigants had not actually raised it.118
In 2002, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris upheld a school voucher program from Cleveland,
Ohio, which allowed parents to use public money to help pay for private-school education,
including at religious schools.119 Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and John Paul Stevens,
dissented, elaborating at length the dangers of political divisiveness that the voucher program
engendered.120 But Rehnquist’s majority opinion, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy, dismissed these concerns in a footnote, refusing to consider “the invisible specters of
‘divisiveness’ and ‘religious strife.’”121 Instead, Rehnquist applied only the purpose and effects
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Id. at 807-08.
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Id. at 808 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
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Id. Thomas nonetheless concluded that Meek and Wolman were “no longer good law.” Id.
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Id. at 717-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 662 n.7. Rehnquist explained:

Justice Breyer would raise the invisible specters of ‘divisiveness’ and ‘religious strife’ to find the program
unconstitutional. It is unclear exactly what sort of principle Justice Breyer has in mind, considering that the
program has ignited no ‘divisiveness’ or ’strife’ other than this litigation. Nor is it clear where Justice
Breyer would locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they have
chosen but that we subjectively find ‘divisive.’ We quite rightly have rejected the claim that some
speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the constitutionality of educational aid programs.
Id.
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prongs. He focused on effects but did not articulate specific factors encompassed within that
prong (such as entanglements); rather he emphasized that, under the voucher program, the
government remained neutral (providing money for public and private schools, including
religious ones)122 and that parents retained “private choice” to decide where they would spend
their vouchers.123 Besides joining Rehnquist’s majority opinion, O’Connor concurred, adding
that Agostini had “folded the entanglement inquiry” into the effects prong.124
Nowadays, then, the justices still usually maintain that the Lemon test—or at least, its
first two prongs (purpose and effects)—is, for the most part, still good law. But the justices have
so vigorously assailed the entanglements prong, including especially its political divisiveness
element, that its vitality is uncertain. The Court’s treatment of two Ten Commandments cases in
2005 illustrates this indefiniteness. In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, a five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated the posting of the Ten Commandments in
county courthouses,125 but in Van Orden v. Perry, also a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld a
display of the Ten Commandments etched on a monument that sat in a monument park
surrounding the Texas state capitol (there were seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical
markers).126 Breyer was the swing vote, belonging to the majority in each case. In McCreary,
he joined Souter’s majority opinion, but in Van Orden, he refused to join Rehnquist’s opinion,
which thus represented a four-justice plurality. Souter’s McCreary opinion maneuvered warily
through the Lemon thicket. Souter began by stating that Lemon had “summarized … three
familiar considerations for evaluating establishment clause claims,” but he never expressly
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Id. at 648-63.
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entanglements prong. Instead, he focused on the county governments’ purposes in posting the
Ten Commandments. Yet, within this discussion of purposes, Souter embedded politicaldivisiveness concerns, quoting O’Connor’s explication of her endorsement test as protecting
political equality. “By showing a purpose to favor religion, the government ‘sends the …
message to … nonadherents ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members.’”128 Meanwhile, in Van Orden, Rehnquist’s plurality opinion brushed aside all of the
Lemon prongs as “not useful in dealing” with the Ten Commandments display.129 Instead,
Rehnquist emphasized that the government, throughout history, had similarly displayed religious
symbols and communicated religious messages; the tradition should be sustained.130 To
Rehnquist, the potential political divisiveness of religious symbols and displays, like the Ten
Commandments, was beside the point.
II. In Defense of the Entanglements Prong
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Lemon did not persuasively justify the entanglementsprong protection against political divisiveness. While Burger’s failure does not necessarily
impugn the political-divisiveness component, it does demand a response. This Part of the Article
draws on political theory, supported by social science research, and American history to justify
judicial efforts to diminish religiously-inspired political divisiveness.
A. Political Theory

127

545 U.S. at 859.
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Id. at 860 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), and Santa
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Political theory, bolstered by social science evidence, justifies a judicial concern for
religiously-inspired political divisiveness. From the framing through the 1920s, the United
States operated as a republican democracy. Citizens and elected officials were supposed to be
virtuous: in the political realm, they were to pursue the common good or public welfare rather
than their own private interests.131 The pursuit of “partial or private interests” was the corruption
of republican government.132 To be sure, during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the
conceptions of virtue and the common good transformed. For instance, in the 1790s, Americans
condemned political parties as factional groups bent on satisfying their own interests. Political
parties threatened the welfare of the republic.133 By the middle of the nineteenth century,
however, the political party had become an accepted institution of republican democracy.
Parties, it now seemed, promoted the common good by encouraging the average person to
participate in the democratic process.134 In fact, with the acceptance of political parties, voter
turnout increased dramatically during the first part of the nineteenth century. In 1824, voter
turnout for the presidential election was only 16.2 percent, but with the help of political parties,
turnout soared to an antebellum high of 77.5 percent in 1840. After the Civil War, turnout
continued to climb, reaching a high of 82.4 percent for the 1876 election.135
While republican democracy proved flexible and resilient, a variety of forces, including
industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, placed it under tremendous strain in the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.136 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the regime finally
131
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collapsed and was replaced by a new one: pluralist democracy. In the republican system, an
alleged lack of civic virtue could preclude one from participating in democratic processes. On
this ground, the exclusion of African Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants, and other peripheral
groups was supposedly justified.137 Under pluralist democracy, however, one did not need to
demonstrate civic virtue to qualify as a participant. During the thirties, many ethnic and
immigrant urbanites who had previously been discouraged from partaking in national politics
became voters and actively cast their support for the New Deal.138 But with more widespread
participation, the point of democratic politics changed: politics became the pursuit of selfinterest rather than the common good. Interest-group efforts to satisfy preexisting values and
desires became normal and legitimate. Governmental goals could no longer be condemned as
contravening the common good; all such substantive goals were determined through interestgroup bargaining, coalition building, negotiation, and compromise. Ultimately, then, pluralist
democracy was defined through a process that ensured full and fair participation, the assertion of
one’s interests and values, especially in the legislative arena.139
Pluralist democracy emerged first as a social and political reality in the early 1930s,
though by the end of the decade, political and constitutional theorists were struggling to explicate
and justify this new form of democratic practice.140 After World War II, Robert A. Dahl
emerged as, perhaps, the foremost theorist of pluralist democracy.141 Dahl began by
137
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emphasizing the crucial difference between republican and pluralist democracies. “[T]he ancient
belief that citizens both could and should pursue the public good rather than their private ends
became more difficult to sustain, and even impossible, as ‘the public good’ fragmented into
individual and group interests.”142 Because pluralist (or polyarchal) democracy accepted the
inexorable pursuit of self-interest—rather than the pursuit of an ideal substantive goal (the
common good)—pluralist democracy required the institutionalization of a “process” that would
allow the people to determine which interests would be at least temporarily enshrined as
communal goals.143 A communal goal was legitimate only if the conditions for democracy were
satisfied—if the proper process were followed. Thus, Dahl’s primary aim was to identify the
conditions or prerequisites for the operation of a democratic process.144 For instance, in an
election, the weight of each individual’s vote must be “identical,” and a candidate or policy
alternative “with the greatest number of votes [must be] declared the winning choice.”145 But the
first and foremost condition for democracy, Dahl explained, is “effective participation.”146
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate
opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final
outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the
agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.147
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During the post-World War II era, pluralist democracy achieved hegemonic status as the
correct theory and practice of democracy.148 Even during the heights of the so-called civic
republican revival of the late-twentieth century—when historians and political scientists
rediscovered the republican democratic roots of the nation—pluralist democracy retained its
predominant position.149 Few historians of republican democracy doubted that, at some point in
American history, pluralist democracy (or some type of liberalism) had supplanted civic
republicanism; the scholarly debates revolved largely around the timing of the transition. 150
Given this unequivocal primacy of pluralist democracy, the issue of religiously-inspired political
divisiveness vis-à-vis the establishment clause should be approached from within pluralist
democratic parameters.
Pluralist democracy assumes that citizens bring diverse preexisting interests and values to
the democratic arena, that they jostle for advantage, and that they try to win the democratic
battles—but also that they negotiate and compromise when expedient.151 Crucially, while
pluralist democratic citizens might strongly hold and pursue their preexisting interests and
values, they must always be willing to accommodate the interests and values of others.152
“Compromise [and] unreflective practicality” lubricate the gears of a pluralist democratic
regime,153 while all forms of “moralistic absolutism” bring the machine to a halt.154 Thus, the
148
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difficulty of religiously-inspired political positions: some religious beliefs are absolutes. They
are not merely strongly held positions; they are convictions, imbued with certitude, excluding
doubt. For instance, the Baptist Faith and Message, adopted in the year 2000, begins as follows:
The Holy Bible was written by men divinely inspired and is God's revelation of Himself
to man. It is a perfect treasure of divine instruction. It has God for its author, salvation
for its end, and truth, without any mixture of error, for its matter. Therefore, all Scripture
is totally true and trustworthy. It reveals the principles by which God judges us, and
therefore is, and will remain to the end of the world, the true center of Christian union,
and the supreme standard by which all human conduct, creeds, and religious opinions
should be tried.155
By the very nature of such religious convictions, they sometimes cannot be
accommodated to other interests and values, whether in the democratic arena or elsewhere. A
religious individual should not be expected to compromise an absolute truth derived from God’s
Scripture. Presidential candidate Mike Huckabee openly proclaims his religiosity: “My faith is
my life—it defines me. My faith doesn’t influence my decisions, it drives them.”156
Unsurprisingly, on the issue of abortion, Huckabee emphasizes his resoluteness: “My
convictions regarding the sanctity of life have always been clear and consistent, without
equivocation or wavering.”157 Most important, then, religious convictions at times cannot be
readily harmonized with the pluralist democratic process, which requires the willingness of
citizens to negotiate and compromise. Indeed, according to Dahl, democracy might be said to
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history Martin Marty explains, some religious believers “resist efforts at finding consensus.”159
From their perspective, the religious should not be sacrificed to the profane.160
Besides impeding compromise, religiously-inspired political divisiveness is likely to
interfere with the pluralist democratic process in another way. When religious convictions
permeate political debates, religious minorities probably will be the losers—precisely because
they depart from the religious mainstream. According to Dahl, the criteria requisite to pluralist
democracy require that participants possess certain enforceable legal rights, such as freedom of
speech.161 One right essential to the pluralist democratic process—arising from the process
itself—is political equality.162 Each citizen must be afforded a full and fair opportunity to
influence political debates, regardless of religious beliefs, racial makeup, sexual orientation, and
so on. Significantly, Dahl insists that, as a matter of logic, a democratic majority cannot impair
such crucial rights, like political equality, while acting in accordance with democratic processes.
“[I]n such a case the majority would not—could not—be acting by ‘perfectly democratic
procedures’ [because these rights] are integral to the democratic process.”163 Without the
protection of “primary political rights,”164 individuals would be unable “to participate fully, as
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Moreover, Dahl seeks a “‘real’ political equality,’”166 not merely a “‘formal’” equality.167 In
Dahl’s terminology, “political resources” must be distributed relatively equally.168 If
governmental actions diminish the political influence of religious minorities qua religious
minorities, then from Dahl’s perspective, the formal requirements for pluralist democracy cannot
possibly be satisfied.169 To be sure, religious minorities will unavoidably be on the losing side in
some political disputes. Winning and losing are the constant companions of democratic rule; no
individual or societal group can be guaranteed victory. But the government should not be
permitted to take actions that persistently push religious minorities onto the losing side.
Religious minorities are entitled to political equality, to the right to influence political debates
equally with all other citizens.170
Unshakable religious convictions not only threaten to thwart the pluralist democratic
process, they also threaten to weaken the American commitment to democratic culture. Dahl
maintains that pluralist democracy can be sustained only if the people maintain a culture
conducive to the democratic process.171 “In practice … the democratic process isn’t likely to be
preserved for very long unless the people of a country preponderantly believe that it’s desirable
165

Id. at 175. Democracy has limits “built into the very nature of the process itself. If you exceed those
limits, then you necessarily violate the democratic process.” Id. at 172.
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democratic culture encompasses an ethos that facilitates negotiation and compromise. If
individuals are inflexible, if they refuse to find a middle ground, the democratic process cannot
get off the ground. Thus, when a religion inculcates absolutes, and when those absolutes are
translated into political agendas and goals that are non-negotiable, the mix of religion and
politics diminishes the culture of democracy. And legal doctrine, Dahl argues, cannot overcome
a deficient culture; courts cannot compel an undemocratic people to govern themselves in
accordance with the pluralist democratic process.173 Even so, courts might help nurture the
democratic culture—by proscribing governmental actions that would encourage the people to
inject their religious beliefs into the public square and political debates.
But when governmental actions generate religiously-inspired political divisiveness, then
the government likely undermines both political equality and democratic culture. Psychological
studies demonstrate that identity with or membership in social groups strongly influences
individual attitudes toward others. An individual tends to disfavor outgroup members while
simultaneously favoring “in-group members in the allocation of rewards, in their personal regard,
and in the evaluation of the products of their labor.”174 In other words, as a normal function of
social group identity, people favor their own group members while discriminating against others.
Social group identity is so powerful that even the most basic emotional reactions and
assessments of self-interest vary with group membership.175 “[A]n individual will discriminate
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against a member of an out-group even when there is no conflict of interest and there is no past
history of intergroup hostility.”176 Moreover, empirical research suggests that religious
membership not only is an especially salient source of group identification but also often shapes
political outlooks.177 Religious orientation influences even judges, who are (supposedly)
obligated professionally to decide cases neutrally, in accordance with the rule of law. In one
empirical study of establishment-clause and free-exercise-clause cases in the lower federal
courts, covering 1986 to 1995, the authors concluded that in “religious freedom decisions, the
single most prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial decisionmaking was
religion—religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge, and the
demographics of the community.”178 Other studies showed that judges’ religious affiliations
influenced their perceptions of not only religious-freedom cases per se but also cases involving
gay rights, obscenity, the death penalty, and gender discrimination.179 In short, empirical
evidence suggests that religious affiliation can be a strong source of social identification and that
such social identification is likely to engender social and political division and discrimination.
Majority-ingroup members will disfavor minority-outgroup members. When the government
nurtures religious identification, the governmental action will thus frequently encourage political
divisiveness detrimental to political equality and democratic culture.
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Finally, the nature of religion itself exacerbates the threat to pluralist democracy.
Religion cannot be easily cabined in some hypothetical religious realm, separate from a secular
realm. For some religious individuals, for some religions, religious convictions are always
pressing outwards, pushing into worldly affairs. Marty explains:
In the pursuits that observers call religion, people aspire to deal with the ultimate, the
whole, the unum, the All. They are alert to evocations of awe and wonder. Their sense
of the sacred leads most of them to build community and undertake various sorts of
mission. Therefore religion, when vital, is never easily contained within a defined and
disciplined sphere. Religion is never self-contained, never unconnected. It always stands
the potential of being “widened.”180
Religion, then, will seek to insinuate itself into political debates. And certainly, in a country as
religious as the United States,181 a mix of religion and politics might seem inevitable. But this
inevitability does not mean that the government, in general, and the courts, in particular, should
stir the mix by encouraging it. Because religious convictions can impair the pluralist democratic
process, pluralist democracy is persistently pitted in battle against religion (or at least against
some religions). In this battle, the government and the courts should not surrender—though one
should never expect religion to surrender either. To be sure, despite the tenuous status of
religion within the pluralist democratic process, the free exercise of religion must be protected;
government should not attempt to subdue religious practices and beliefs. Without the free
exercise of religion, individual liberty would be stillborn. But partly for that very reason—
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because of the special constitutional protection afforded to religion—courts should acknowledge
and guard against the tension between religion and pluralist democracy.182
B. History
American history is replete with examples of political strife produced by religious
differences. In the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant educators sought to create common (or
public) schools that would instill Protestant values and attitudes in Catholic children by, for
instance, having the children read from the Protestant King James Bible.183 Simultaneously,
Protestants fought politically to prevent the extension of governmental funding to private
religious [read: Catholic] schools. The anti-aid advocates managed to secure constitutional
amendments in several states precluding such funding, and almost succeeded in pushing through
a similar amendment (the Blaine Amendment of 1876) to the national Constitution.184 During
the early-twentieth century, massive immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe—often
more than one-million people per year—combined with Protestant-American nativism to
generate long-running political battles over the restriction of immigration.185 The antiimmigration forces emphasized the ostensible racial and religious inferiority of recent
immigrants.186 Albert Johnson, Chair of the House Committee on Immigration, complained
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especially about recent Jewish immigrants and called for a complete suspension of immigration,
lasting for two years. Johnson relied on a report from Wilbur J. Carr, head of the United States
Consular Service (in the State Department), that stated: “[Potential Jewish immigrants were] of
the usual ghetto type. Most of them are … . filthy, un-American and often dangerous in their
habits.”187 They were, Carr added, “[p]hysically deficient … . [m]entally deficient … .
[e]conomically undesirable [and] [s]ocially undesirable: Eighty-five to ninety per cent lack any
conception of patriotic or national spirit. And the majority of this percentage is mentally
incapable of acquiring it.”188 In the 1920s, the anti-immigrant advocates triumphed; quotas were
established that almost eliminated Jewish and Catholic immigration from Eastern and Southern
Europe.189
Republican democracy, it should be emphasized, facilitated the manifestation of nativist
and exclusionary attitudes throughout the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
Condemnations of Catholics, Jews, and other outsiders were often couched in republican
democratic terminology: they lacked the civic virtue needed to understand the American
commitment to the common good. Political discrimination against religious minorities could alltoo-easily be legitimated in accord with republican principles. “The chief argument against the
wholesale admission of unassimilable aliens,” wrote the editor of World’s Work, “is that it
creates nationalistic and racial blocs which are constantly bringing pressure to bear upon lawmaking bodies in the interests of their particular nationalities, which do not think like Americans,
but which retain indefinitely their European and Asiatic consciousness.”190 Consequently, from
187

Congressional Committee on Immigration, Temporary Suspension of Immigration (1920), reprinted in
The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History 405, 406 (Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz eds.,
1980).
188

Id. at 407.

189

Immigration Act of 1924, reprinted in 2 Documents of American History 372 (Henry Steele Commager
ed., 3d ed. 1947); E. P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965, at 175-76,
187-92 (1981); Howard M. Sachar, A History of the Jews in America 323-24 (1992).
190

Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper 211 (1995).

Divided We Fall -37-

the perspective of many old-stock Americans, religious minorities were to be either banished
from the country or inculcated with Protestant-American values (hence, the need for Bible
reading and similar activities in the public schools).191
The power of religion to skew American politics was never more evident than in the
presidential election of 1928. The Republican candidate was the former Secretary of Commerce,
Herbert Hoover. The Democratic candidate was Al Smith, an Irish-Catholic, a child of an
immigrant, and an opponent of Prohibition. 192 A four-time governor of New York, Smith
reveled in his Lower East Side (Manhattan) identity: “The derby hat set at a slightly rakish
angle, the flashy suits, the big cigar, the slight swagger, the striking pronunciations all bespoke
New York.”193 Smith represented what the populist and Protestant fundamentalist leader
William Jennings Bryan had called “the enemy’s country.”194 With Smith opposing Hoover, the
1928 election encapsulated the nation’s multiple interrelated divisions: “Catholics versus
Protestants, wets versus drys, immigrants versus natives, and city versus country.”195
Smith became the first Catholic nominated by a major political party only because, by the
late 1920s, immigrants and their children constituted approximately one-third of the American
population. Even so, the salience of American anti-Catholicism intensified dramatically during
the 1928 presidential campaign exactly because of Smith’s candidacy.196 A Methodist Bishop
from New York State declared, “No Governor can kiss the papal ring and get within gunshot of
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corner in the South than see the foreigners elect Al Smith President!”198 The Christian Century,
a liberal Protestant publication, encouraged its readers to resist “the seating of a representative of
an alien culture, of a mediaeval Latin mentality, of an undemocratic hierarchy and of a foreign
potentate in the great office of President of the United States.”199 Anti-Smith pamphlets sported
titles like “Traffic in Nuns” and “Alcohol Smith.”200 A Tennessee editor and historian brooded:
[Smith appeals] to the aliens, who feel that the older America, the America of the AngloSaxon stock, is a hateful thing which must be overturned and humiliated; to the Northern
negroes, who lust for social equality and racial dominance; to the Catholics who have
been made to believe that they are entitled to the White House, and to the Jews who
likewise are to be instilled with the feeling that this is the time for God’s chosen people to
chastise America yesteryear. … As great as have been my doubts about Hoover, he is
sprung from American soil and stock.201
Smith himself recognized that his ties to the national populace were tenuous. He ran as
an economic conservative and, like Hoover, invoked the republican democratic principles of
virtue and the common good. Whereas Protestant nativists castigated Smith for his Catholicism,
Smith and other Democrats realized they should not attempt to attract Catholic voters qua
Catholics. Democratic supporters did not “launch a sectarian campaign on behalf of Al Smith,”
but rather called for religious freedom.202 Regardless, Smith lost the election, and decisively so,
garnering only 15 million popular and 87 electoral votes to Hoover’s 21 million popular and 444
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the traditionally strong Democratic South, where he lost almost all major cities, including
Birmingham, Dallas, and Atlanta.204 Most distinctly, Smith lost votes because of his
Catholicism. “Protestant opposition to Smith’s religion was remarkably widespread, extending
to all regions of the nation, to city and country, to church members and unaffiliated
Protestants.”205
Of course, another Irish-Catholic nominee successfully ran for president in 1960. John F.
Kennedy’s victorious campaign demonstrated two important facts. First, the transformation of
the United States in the 1930s from a republican into a pluralist democracy mattered: erstwhile
outsiders could participate en masse in national politics without first proving that they were
sufficiently virtuous to qualify as voting citizens (and they could, therefore, help elect a
Catholic).206 Second, even within the pluralist democratic regime, the potential for religiouslyinspired political divisiveness remained strong. Early in Kennedy’s campaign, many ProtestantAmericans questioned whether his Catholicism rendered him an unworthy candidate.207
Alluding to the feared allegiance of a Catholic president to the Vatican, best-selling author and
Protestant minister, Norman Vincent Peale, wondered whether JFK was as “free as any other
American to give ‘his first loyalty to the United States.’”208 In response to such expressions of
doubt, Kennedy was moved to make a well-publicized speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial
203
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Association on September 12, 1960, in order to address, in his words, “the so-called religious
issue.”209 Kennedy told his audience:
Because I am a Catholic, and no Catholic has ever been elected President, the real issues
in this campaign have been obscured—perhaps deliberately, in some quarters less
responsible than this. So it is apparently necessary for me to state once again—not what
kind of church I believe in, for that should be important only to me—but what kind of
America I believe in. I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is
absolute—where no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be Catholic) how
to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote—where no
church or church school is granted any public funds or political preference—and where
no man is denied public office merely because his religion differs from the President who
might appoint him or the people who might elect him.210
After further elaborating his concept of the separation of church and state, Kennedy reiterated
that he spoke only for himself. “[F]or contrary to common newspaper usage, I am not the
Catholic candidate for President. I am the Democratic Party’s candidate for President who
happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters—and the church
does not speak for me.”211 While the effects of Kennedy’s speech are difficult to gauge, he
unquestionably lost votes because of his religion even as he won the election, polling only
118,574 more popular votes than Richard Nixon.212
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III. Proscribed Governmental Actions
Given that pluralist democratic theory and American history justify judicial efforts to
diminish religiously-inspired political divisiveness, one must ask the following question: what
governmental actions should courts proscribe pursuant to the Lemon entanglements prong (or
some similar doctrinal protection against religiously-inspired political divisiveness, such as the
endorsement test)? This Part of the Article focuses on two types of governmental actions:
funding of religious activities or institutions, such as religious schools; and sponsoring or
displaying of religious symbols, such as crèches. The justices, after articulating the
entanglements prong in Lemon, never developed it to its full potential. While they repeatedly
considered political divisiveness in the context of governmental funding cases, they never
explored its ramifications in the context of governmental displays of religious symbols.
Consequently, I will discuss the former type of case but concentrate on the latter.
A. Governmental Funding of Religion
When the government funds religious practices or institutions, the government introduces
an issue that could readily lead to religiously-inspired political divisions. As the justices have
explained in numerous cases, including Lemon, Meek, and Aguilar, the provision of
governmental funding is rarely a one-time affair.213 Rather, once the government initiates a
funding program—let’s say, funding remedial instruction in all elementary and secondary
schools, whether public or private (including religious schools)—then individuals and interest
groups are likely to assail the legislature (or other appropriate governmental body) with requests
for funding (or more funding) on an annual basis. When such funding might or might not be
provided to certain religious schools, then the respective religious officials will be motivated to
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lobby the legislature not only to provide funding in accordance with certain favorable criteria but
to increase the amount of funding. Because such funding programs are likely to encourage
religious communities to act as political interest groups, often opposing other religiously-inspired
interest groups, the courts should proscribe this type of governmental action pursuant to the
entanglements prong.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Zelman, joined by Stevens and Souter, persuasively explained
the need for such a judicial proscription. The majority upheld a school voucher program that
allowed parents to use public money to help pay for religious-school education, but Breyer
reasoned that such a program would engender religiously-inspired political divisiveness. Breyer
recognized that immigration had produced not only momentous demographic but also
concomitant social changes.
When [deciding Lemon and Nyquist], the Court did not deny that an earlier American
society might have found a less clear-cut church/state separation compatible with social
tranquility. Indeed, historians point out that during the early years of the Republic,
American schools—including the first public schools—were Protestant in character.
Their students recited Protestant prayers, read the King James version of the Bible, and
learned Protestant religious ideals. Those practices may have wrongly discriminated
against members of minority religions, but given the small number of such individuals,
the teaching of Protestant religions in schools did not threaten serious social conflict.
The 20th century Court was fully aware, however, that immigration and growth had
changed American society dramatically since its early years. By 1850, 1.6 million
Catholics lived in America, and by 1900 that number rose to 12 million. There were
similar percentage increases in the Jewish population.214
If anything, Breyer continued, the nation has grown even more religiously diverse.
Today, the United States “boasts more than 55 different religious groups and subgroups with a
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significant number of members. Major religions include, among others, Protestants, Catholics,
Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs. And several of these major religions contain
different subsidiary sects with different religious beliefs.”215 Given this social and religious
reality, Breyer explained that the Court had to choose between two different interpretations of
the establishment clause. On the one hand, the Court might use an “‘equal opportunity’
approach”216—giving each religion an equal chance, for example, “to secure state funding or to
pray in the public schools.”217 On the other hand, the Court might draw “fairly clear lines of
separation between church and state.”218 The problem was that, in practice, the “‘equal
opportunity’ approach was not workable.”219 When so many diverse religions are battling for
access to funding or to inject their views into the public schools, some religions will inevitably
be favored. Equal opportunity, much less “‘equal treatment,’”220 could only be hypothetical, not
actual. Just as important, the equal opportunity approach would encourage the sundry religious
groups to pursue their own respective interests as strongly as possible in the political realm. The
equal opportunity approach, that is, would nurture religiously-inspired political divisiveness.
The only workable method to achieve equality among religions was separation: removing the
government from religious schools, and removing religions from the public schools.221
Finally, Breyer explained why the Cleveland, Ohio, voucher program challenged in
Zelman was not truly equal and would likely generate religiously-inspired political battles.
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Recall, Rehnquist’s majority opinion emphasized that parents retained “private choice” to decide
where they would spend their vouchers.222 Partly for that reason, Rehnquist maintained that the
governmental program was neutral; all religious schools were afforded an equal opportunity to
benefit from the vouchers. Breyer, however, responded: the government will necessarily
articulate criteria for participating in any voucher program. “Consider the voucher program here
at issue,” Breyer wrote.223 “That program insists that the religious school accept students of all
religions. Does that criterion treat fairly groups whose religion forbids them to do so?”224 Even
further, the Cleveland program required that any participating school not “‘advocate or foster
unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national
origin, or religion.’”225 The existence of such limits on the voucher program, however
reasonable, will necessarily encourage sundry religious groups to lobby for criteria favorable to
themselves. Political conflicts could readily take shape around religious differences, as not all
religious schools were being treated equally. “How will the public react to government funding
for schools that take controversial religious positions on topics that are of current popular
interest—say, the conflict in the Middle East or the war on terrorism?”226 In addition, Breyer
emphasized that governmental officials would need to determine whether particular schools
satisfied the statutory criteria. For instance, a governmental official would need to decide
whether a school teaches hatred of other religions. Does a Catholic school teach hatred of
Judaism if it, following the Vatican, instructs students “to pray that God ‘enlighten’ the hearts of
Jews ‘so that they recognize Jesus Christ, Savior of all mankind?’”227 Do we really want a
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governmental official to resolve this question? Such an intrusion of the government into
religious affairs would, Breyer reasoned, engender resentment and divisiveness.228 In sum, if
even a private-choice school voucher program, like the one in Cleveland, would likely generate
religiously-inspired political divisiveness, as Breyer convincingly argues, then the Court should
remain wary of any governmental program funding religious institutions or practices.
B. Governmental Displays of Religious Symbols
The entanglements-prong prohibition against governmental actions that engender
religiously-inspired political divisiveness should preclude the government from sponsoring or
displaying religious symbols, such as crèches. Of course, governmental displays of religious
symbols sometimes entail the spending of governmental funds, and such an expenditure might
produce unconstitutional political divisiveness (as discussed in the previous section). Yet,
religious symbolism cases usually differ from the ordinary religious funding case. Often, in a
religious symbolism case, the expenditure of governmental money is minimal. Furthermore, the
governmental display of a religious symbol is not likely to produce annual (or repetitive)
legislative battles over the amount of and the criteria for funding.
Even so, regardless of funding, the governmental display of a religious symbol is likely
in-and-of-itself to generate political divisiveness that should be deemed unconstitutional. To be
clear, the Court has never interpreted the entanglements prong in this manner, but such judicial
protection follows from the arguments justifying the diminishment of political divisiveness.
While some justices have deprecated the entanglements inquiry, including the politicaldivisiveness component, as “mystifying,”229 a public display of a religious symbol usually has at
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least one readily decipherable political meaning. Publicly displayed religious symbols connote
priority. The message is one of division and inequality: the community and the government
favor one particular religion over others.
The Lynch case, upholding a Pawtucket municipal display of a crèche,230 underscored
how a publicly displayed religious symbol can establish religious and political priority. As
argued in an amicus curiae brief filed jointly by the American Jewish Committee and the
National Council of the Churches of Christ, religious displays are likely to demarcate certain
citizens as social and political insiders and others as outsiders in accordance with their religious
orientations.231 After the American Civil Liberties Union initiated the legal challenge, the
Pawtucket mayor alluded to such a division of citizens into insiders and outsiders. He
emphasized that the crèche was a crucial element of the extensive Christmas display—which
also included, among other things, a Christmas tree, a Santa Claus house, and a ‘Seasons
Greetings’ sign232—exactly because of the crèche’s religious message; the mayor condemned the
lawsuit as “a petty attack aimed at taking Christ out of Christmas.”233 As reported in a
Providence, Rhode Island newspaper, a Baptist reverend more explicitly explained that the
message of the crèche was one of religious and political priority.
[W]hen anybody attacks Christianity and nibbles away, eventually the whole structure of
American society is threatened. This is a Christian country. We invite all men to take
residence here. But one condition of that residency is that they respect our traditions.
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These are a part of America and we feel that whoever comes in has an obligation to
respect them, to become familiar with them, and to abide by them.234
Public support for maintaining the crèche display was powerful and unmistakable.
Ninety percent of the messages to the ACLU and the city endorsed the crèche.235 After the
district court trial, the judge reviewed approximately seventy letters sent to the mayor and local
newspapers and concluded as follows:
Overall the tenor of the correspondence is that the lawsuit represents an attack on the
presence of religion as part of the community’s life, an attempt to deny the majority the
ability to express publicly its beliefs in a desired and traditionally accepted way. In the
Mayor’s words, “The people absolutely resent somebody trying to impose another kind
of religion on them. … I think the denigration, trying to eliminate these kinds of things, is
a step towards establishing another religion, non-religion that it may be.”236
Meanwhile, a clinical psychologist testified at trial:
[F]or the child who belongs to a non-Christian family, seeing a Nativity scene as part of a
City-sponsored Christmas display will raise “profound questions for that child insofar as
whether or not he is okay or more importantly and as part of that whether his parents are
okay.” The child will question, because of the setting in which the Nativity scene occurs,
his identification with the American culture.237
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lynch, the Jewish Dean of the New York
University School of Law admitted in the New York Times, “When I see a government-supported
crèche, I suddenly feel as if I have become a stranger in my own home, to be tolerated only as
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lends its support to a Christian religious observance, Jews and other non-Christians are
automatically excluded.”239
In other words, the public display of a religious symbol, the crèche, engendered social
divisions based largely on religious differences, and such divisions were manifested in
widespread continuing public support for the display. Of course, the Burger majority opinion
disregarded such religiously-inspired political divisiveness.240 But frequently, as in this case,
symbols make a difference. In fact, as the lawsuit and the resultant backlash in Lynch
demonstrated, not only might public displays of religious symbols create religiously-inspired
political divisiveness, but also the legal and political battles that ensue because of such displays
might generate additional (and more fervent) divisiveness. By ignoring divisiveness and its
potential damage to the pluralist democratic process, the Court cultivates exclusionary practices
reminiscent of republican democracy. The Court fosters a return to the ‘good ol’ days’ when, in
practice, white Protestant values were deemed virtuous and white Protestant goals were
enshrined as the common good. Protestant Bible reading and prayers in the public schools?
Why not?
Why not? Because the public performance of religious rituals, the public recitation of
religious tenets, and the public display of religious symbols contravene the political equality that
undergirds pluralist democracy. The dissenters in Van Orden v. Perry, which upheld the Ten
Commandments display etched on a monument in the Texas state capitol monument park,241
emphasized how that religious display struck at the heart of political equality. Souter’s
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, underscored “the
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simple realities that the Ten Commandments constitute a religious statement, that their message
is inherently religious, and that the purpose of singling them out in a display is clearly the
same.”242 Thomas admitted as much in his concurrence: “Of course, the Ten Commandments
are religious—they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore,
has religious significance.”243 Stevens’s dissent, joined by Ginsburg, explained that the Ten
Commandments display was not only religious but sectarian on two accounts.244 First, the
display favored Christianity and Judaism because the Ten Commandments is “‘a sacred text’”
for those religions (and Islam) but not others.245 The Ten Commandments prescribe “a
compelled code of conduct from one God, namely, a Judeo-Christian God, that is rejected by
prominent polytheistic sects, such as Hinduism, as well as nontheistic religions, such as
Buddhism.”246 Second, within the religions that accept the Ten Commandments, “different
religions and even different denominations within a particular faith”247 subscribe to “distinctive
versions” of it.248 The state of Texas necessarily chose to prioritize one particular version of the
Decalogue by displaying it on a monument. In fact, one purpose of the monument display was
proselytization, to guide youth by inspiring “renewed respect for the law of God.”249 Finally,
Stevens concluded by emphasizing that the governmental display of the Ten Commandments
would undermine political equality by promoting religiously-inspired political divisiveness.
242

Id. at 738 (Souter, J., dissenting).

243

Id. at 690 (Thomas, J., concurring).

244

“The message transmitted by Texas' chosen display is quite plain: This State endorses the divine code of
the ‘Judeo-Christian’ God.” Id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245

Id. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)). As Scalia has
pointed out elsewhere, Islam also accepts the divinity of the Ten Commandments. McCreary County v. American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246

545 U.S. at 719 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

247

Id. at 717 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

248

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

249

Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Divided We Fall -50-

Recognizing the diversity of religious and secular beliefs held by Texans and by all
Americans, it seems beyond peradventure that allowing the seat of government to serve
as a stage for the propagation of an unmistakably Judeo-Christian message of piety would
have the tendency to make nonmonotheists and nonbelievers “feel like [outsiders] in
matters of faith, and [strangers] in the political community.” “[D]isplays of this kind
inevitably have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt differences
among individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal.”250
In McCreary, invalidating displays of the Ten Commandments in county courthouses,251 Scalia’s
dissent candidly admitted that such a public display acknowledges a governmental preference for
certain religions (monotheistic ones) over other religions (polytheistic ones).252 From Scalia’s
viewpoint, however, the Constitution allows the government to grant its imprimatur to certain
religions.253 Equality be damned!
IV. Conclusion
Richard W. Garnett and Noah Feldman both argue that Americans should accept
religiously-inspired political divisiveness. They fret that the judicial enforcement of political
equality pursuant to the establishment clause—the judicial proscription of governmental actions
that would engender religiously-inspired political divisiveness—would lead to unacceptable
consequences.254 Establishment-clause doctrine would become skewed and produce outlandish
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admits, but that “does not mean that they can or should supply the enforceable content of the
First Amendment’s prohibition on establishments of religion.”256 Basically, Garnett and
Feldman suggest that religious minorities should develop tougher skins and stop being so
sensitive. Does it really hurt to gaze at a governmental display of a crèche?257
Well, yes, it does, as this Article has shown. The political theory of pluralist democracy,
the social science research documenting the power of religious identity, and the history of
religious discrimination in the United States demonstrate that the importation of religious
divisions into the political realm can thwart the pluralist democratic process. Without political
equality, pluralist democracy does not exist. To be sure, republican democracy differed: an
ostensible lack of civic virtue supposedly justified imposing inequality. But pluralist democracy
demands that each and every citizen be afforded a full and fair opportunity to participate, to
assert his or her interests and values in the democratic arena. Citizens, then, must be willing to
negotiate and compromise with other citizens, who are equally entitled to assert their interests
and values. But religiously-inspired political positions sometimes cannot be compromised; they
are absolutes. Moreover, when political stances form around religious orientations, religious
outsiders inevitably lose merely because they are minorities. Throughout American history,
dominant religious groups have translated their values into political goals and imposed them on
minorities when given the opportunity to do so. Religiously-inspired political divisiveness
produces political inequality.258
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Consequently, the Court should interpret the establishment clause to promote political
equality and to protect religious minorities from the ravages wrought by religiously-inspired
political divisiveness. But, to return to the 2008 presidential campaign, discussed at the outset of
this Article, would the political divisiveness component of the entanglements prong prevent
Mike Huckabee from reminding voters that he is the Christian candidate and that Mitt Romney is
Mormon? Would it prevent a large percentage of Americans from refusing to vote for a Mormon
presidential candidate? Certainly not. Supreme Court doctrine does not control American social
attitudes and relations. With Barack Obama winning the Democratic nomination, we are hearing
more rumors suggesting that he is truly Muslim and attended a radical Islamic school as a
child.259 The Court and its establishment-clause proclamations are beside the point, especially
when polls show that between 45 and 54 percent of Americans either will not vote for a Muslim
presidential candidate or will be less likely to do so.260
Even so, the Court can and should preclude the government from encouraging such
divisiveness, and the political-divisiveness component of the entanglements prong provides a
mechanism for doing so. Would entanglements cases sometimes lead to doctrinal difficulties, as
Garnett and Noah Feldman worry? My recommended applications of the political-divisiveness
governmental support. There were so many competing religions that disestablishment seemed to be a reasonable
stalemate (and this fact led to the gradual disestablishment of state churches, as well). Feldman, Please Don’t, supra
note 2, at 139-41, 148-62. Second, Noah Feldman whitewashes liberty of conscience. To the framing generation,
liberty of conscience (and free exercise) did not connote a freedom to pursue any religious path whatsoever. Rather,
liberty of conscience was a Protestant doctrine that denoted a freedom to follow the truth of Christ. Id. at 55-56, 6566, 147-48, 155-56, 164-69. Thus, Noah Feldman twists the history of the framing period so that it better fits the
religiously diverse nation that the United States has become. Third, while Noah Feldman surreptitiously skews the
history of the framing period, he disregards the historical transition from republican to pluralist democracy.
Feldman, Free Expression, supra note 28. Hence, in turn, he disregards the implications that the transition to
pluralist democracy has for judicial interpretations of the establishment clause.
259

Perry Bacon, Jr., Foes Use Obama’s Muslim Ties to Fuel Rumors About Him, washingtonpost.com, Nov.
29, 2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/28/AR2007112802757.html> (accessed
January 9, 2008); CNN Debunks False Report About Obama, CNN.com, Jan. 23, 2007
<http://www.brookesnews.com/070801obama.html> (accessed January 9, 2008); Jack Wheeler, The Audacity of
Apostasy: Barack Obama’s Muslim Links, BrookesNews.com, Jan. 8, 2007
<http://www.brookesnews.com/070801obama.html> (accessed January 9, 2008).
260

Berkes, supra note 5.

Divided We Fall -53-

proscription—prohibiting most governmental funding of religious activities and institutions and
most governmental displays of religious symbols—would be relatively straightforward. But
wouldn’t some cases be problematic, leading some justices to parse the factual minutiae? Would
a governmentally displayed Christmas tree, for instance, be a prohibited religious symbol?
Undoubtedly, some political-divisiveness issues would lead to hard cases, but vexing cases are
the norm in constitutional law. We should agonize less about the niceties of doctrine and the
lucidity of case outcomes and despair more about the ramifications of religiously-inspired
political divisiveness in the pluralist democratic process.

